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Banks:	A	Broken	Social	Contract	
Mehrsa	Baradaran,	J.	Alton	Hosch	Associate	Professor	of	Law,	University	of	Georgia	
School	of	Law	
The	first	symptoms	of	cancer	can	be	mistaken	for	any	mundane	sickness—
fatigue,	fever,	bloating,	headaches.	You	can	treat	these	symptoms	for	
months—even	years—while	the	cancer	grows	undetected.	Sometimes,	you	
treat	the	symptoms	for	so	long	that	by	the	time	the	cause—the	aggressive	
tumor—is	detected,	it’s	too	late	and	all	you	can	do	is	just	keep	treating	the	
symptoms.	
Financial	crises	are	akin	to	cancer	symptoms.	Though	the	crisis	and	ensuing	
panic	is	itself	painful,	the	root	problem	is	often	less	obvious,	but	much	more	
consequential.	As	the	dust	has	settled	on	the	2008	crisis	and	the	ensuing	
reforms,	it’s	time	to	ask:	Did	we	treat	the	disease	or	just	its	symptoms?	
The	crisis	is	best	understood	in	historical	context.	Specifically,	the	latest	epoch	
of	banking	policy	has	been	one	of	deregulation.	The	banks	asked	to	be	free	
from	the	heavy	legal	restrictions	and	regulations	imposed	after	the	Great	
Depression,	and	the	politicians	obliged.	To	be	sure,	many	of	the	restrictions	
needed	to	be	updated	or	repealed.	And	they	were.	But	as	the	banks	were	
deregulated,	a	new	philosophy	began	to	dominate	the	academy,	industry,	and	
the	minds	of	policymakers.	The	theory	was	that	the	country	would	benefit	
from	a	competitive	and	profitable	banking	system,	which	was	possible	only	if	
government	stayed	out	of	the	business	of	banking.	Policymakers	took	
figurative—and,	in	one	famous	photo‐op	of	leading	banking	regulators—
literal	chainsaws	to	regulations	with	the	assumption	that	a	competitive	
banking	sector	could	regulate	its	own	excesses	and	that	the	“market”	would	
punish	weak	banks	with	failure	and	strong	banks	with	profits.	Indeed,	firms	
were	profitable	for	many	years	and	they	became	more	efficient	as	they	left	
low‐profit	areas	like	poor	inner	city	and	rural	neighborhoods	and	formed	
conglomerates	that	could	lower	costs	through	scale	and	scope.	Few	insiders	
questioned	the	new	philosophy	in	flush	times,	but	when	the	music	stopped,	it	
became	clear	just	how	much	government	intervention	had	stood	between	the	
banks	and	the	abyss.	
The	crisis	revealed	three	specific	problems.	The	first	was	that	the	banks	and	
non‐bank	financial	institutions	created	due	to	deregulation	were	huge,	
interconnected,	and	highly	leveraged.	Their	size	meant	that	their	failure	could	
take	down	major	portions	of	the	economy	and	hurt	undeserving	victims	such	
as	pension	fund	holders	and	savers.	They	were,	in	other	words,	Too	Big	To	
Fail	(TBTF).	As	it	turned	out,	no	one	had	the	stomach	to	stick	to	market	
discipline	in	the	foxhole.	Hank	Paulson	and	Ben	Bernanke	brought	in	all	the	
top	bankers	and	forced	them	to	take	a	bailout.	Once	it	was	clear	that	AIG’s	
massive	shortfall	threatened	the	entire	economy,	there	was	no	choice	but	to	
do	everything	possible	to	prevent	it,	including	the	federal	government	buying	
the	firm.	
Second,	the	panic	started	in	the	“shadow	banking”	sector	and	showed	that	the	
short‐term	credit	transactions	and	derivatives	that	non‐bank	financial	
institutions	traded	and	used	for	funding	for	years	were	similar	to	banking,	and	
thus	prone	to	runs.	Lehman	failed	overnight	because	its	creditors	acted	like	
the	townsfolk	of	Bedford	Falls	demanding	their	money	from	Bailey’s	Building	
&	Loan	lest	it	fail	by	morning.	Except	these	shadow	banks	were	unregulated	
and	unprotected	by	the	FDIC.	As	this	country	figured	out	the	hard	way	during	
the	Great	Depression,	creditor	confidence	is	psychological,	and	only	
government	intervention	in	the	form	of	FDIC	insurance	can	stop	bank	runs.	
Third,	the	entire	premise	of	deregulation	rested	on	an	assumption	that	
individual	firms	and	market	players	could	accurately	calculate	and	manage	
risks,	or	“self‐regulate.”	Every	firm	had	a	risk	management	team	made	up	of	
lots	of	math	Ph.D.s,	or	“quants,”	who	would	run	data‐driven	“stress	tests”	or	
calculate	Value	at	Risk,	and	once	they	had	a	handle	on	risks	of	loss,	they	could	
hedge	that	risk	with	insurance.	Who	sold	all	of	that	insurance?	AIG.	Regulators	
didn’t	get	too	involved,	and	they	outsourced	a	lot	of	their	typical	supervisory	
duties	to	firms’	internal	risk	models,	confident	that	the	market	could	
rationally	digest	information	and	punish	without	externalities.	As	it	turned	
out,	those	models	could	be	overly	optimistic	and	market	discipline	could	be	
erratic	and	ignorant.	
So	did	Dodd‐Frank	fix	these	problems?	
Policymakers	have	repeatedly	promised	that	Dodd‐Frank	did	away	with	
TBTF,	but	that’s	not	fully	accurate.	Here’s	what	Dodd‐Frank	does:	Each	firm	
has	to	submit	a	“living	will”	that	lays	out	a	plan	for	how	it	can	be	liquidated	in	
the	event	of	its	failure,	without	causing	chaos	or	requiring	a	bailout.	The	
regulators	recently	reviewed	these	plans	and	determined	that	five	out	of	the	
largest	eight	banks	do	not	have	a	credible	plan	to	avoid	financial	chaos	or	
government	rescue	in	the	event	of	a	failure.	In	other	words,	they	are	still	too	
big	to	fail.	So	it’s	back	to	the	drawing	board	for	the	banks.	
Dodd‐Frank	also	amended	the	Federal	Reserve’s	emergency	bailout	authority	
outlined	in	Section	13(3)	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Act.	It	can	no	longer	save	just	
one	firm	the	way	it	did	during	the	crisis—it	would	have	to	create	a	fund	with	
“broad‐based	eligibility.”	The	catch	is	that	the	banks	that	emerged	from	the	
crisis	are	bigger	and	fewer	in	number.	So	even	if	a	broad‐based	fund	were	
created,	the	beneficiaries	would	likely	be	the	same	players	as	in	2008.	
Moreover,	it’s	hard	to	believe	that	if	we	faced	another	potential	abyss,	
policymakers	would	not	act	forcefully	to	prevent	the	feared	widespread	
catastrophe.	It’s	not	as	though	the	Fed	or	the	Treasury	felt	bound	by	law	when	
it	administered	the	2008	bailout,	stretching	the	Fed’s	emergency	powers	to	
the	breaking	point.	
As	for	shadow	banking,	the	biggest	step	has	been	to	identify	the	scale	and	
nature	of	the	problem.	By	my	count,	Federal	Reserve	Board	officials	
mentioned	shadow	banking	in	exactly	zero	speeches	from	2003	to	2008	and	
in	20	percent	of	their	speeches	from	2010	to	2016.	Just	talking	about	the	
problem	20	percent	of	the	time	as	opposed	to	zero	is	a	huge	leap	toward	
addressing	it.	Dodd‐Frank	also	created	a	new	super‐regulator,	the	Financial	
Stability	Oversight	Council,	to	oversee	any	large	institution	that	looks	and	
smells	like	a	bank.	The	Fed	will	then	supervise	any	non‐bank	that	the	council	
designates	as	a	Systemically	Important	Financial	Institutions	(SIFI).	Already	
this	designation	has	faced	a	setback	as	a	D.C.	court,	overconfident	and	
suffering	from	amnesia	about	the	systemic	risk	non‐banks	can	cause,	
overturned	MetLife’s	SIFI	designation.	Other	SIFIs	are	said	to	be	lining	up	to	
challenge	their	designation	as	well.	
As	for	those	risk	management	models,	the	Fed	doubled	down	on	them	and	
brought	them	in‐house.	Even	as	the	intellectual	father	of	free	markets	and	
deregulation,	Alan	Greenspan,	admitted	there	was	a	flaw	in	his	assumptions	
about	market	discipline,	the	foundational	theory	of	risk	management	was	not	
thrown	out.	One	of	Dodd‐Frank’s	most	significant	regulatory	changes	is	the	
annual	stress	testing	of	large	firms.	The	Fed,	using	its	own	risk	model	based	
on	historical	data,	runs	each	firm	through	a	stress	test	to	project	if	it	can	
survive	a	shock.	The	good	news	is	that	the	Fed	is	no	longer	deferring	to	pure	
“self‐regulation,”	the	test’s	“financial	shocks,”	or	stressors,	are	worse	than	
what	the	firms	were	modeling	before	2008,	and	every	firm	is	subject	to	the	
test	with	results	made	public.	However,	the	Fed’s	stress	testing	is	built	on	the	
same	foundation	as	the	faulty	risk	management	enterprise—the	assumption	
that	we	have	enough	information	today	to	design	a	hypothetical	scenario	that	
would	accurately	predict	and	prepare	for	a	system‐wide	panic	tomorrow.	
There	are	many	reasons	this	premise	is	dubious,	not	least	of	which	is	that	the	
firms	were	essentially	doing	this	for	years	before	the	crisis	and	their	models	
missed	huge	problems.	
Even	as	Dodd‐Frank	has	attempted	to	fix	the	major	problems	the	crisis	
revealed,	the	law	falls	short	of	real	reform.	In	some	ways,	that	is	because	in	
tone	and	structure,	Dodd‐Frank	has	more	in	common	with	the	deregulatory	
laws	of	the	last	30	years	than	with	the	reforms	of	the	New	Deal	era	or	even	the	
recent	post‐crisis	populist	sentiment.	When	policymakers	were	faced	with	the	
choice	to	make	structural	or	incremental	changes,	they	chose	incremental.	
They	didn’t	break	up	the	banks	or	cause	a	significant	restructuring	of	their	
business	model.	Regulators	also	chose	complexity	over	simpler	tools	of	
reform—technical	fixes	over	a	system	overhaul.	(The	one	major	counterpoint	
in	Dodd‐Frank	is	the	creation	of	Elizabeth	Warren’s	Consumer	Financial	
Protection	Bureau,	which	is	a	major	structural	reform	aimed	at	protecting	
people	against	financial	industry	excess.	The	agency	has	been	vilified	by	the	
financial	sector	since	its	inception,	but	like	its	founder,	the	agency	has	been	
strong	and,	as	far	as	we	know,	uncorrupted.)	
More	consequentially,	policymakers	probed	no	further	than	the	crisis	
required.	They	identified	the	symptoms	and	are	working	on	treating	them,	but	
missed	the	cancer	that	is	still	growing.	They	did	not	realize	that	this	was	not	
just	a	narrow	banking	crisis	to	be	fixed	through	banking	regulation.	
Indeed,	banking	policy	has	always	implicated	much	more	than	just	bank	
safety,	but	also	affects	social	policy,	democracy,	and	the	creation	or	
elimination	of	inequality.	Alexander	Hamilton	thought	that	banks	would	be	
the	most	important	instrument	of	public	policy.	Thomas	Jefferson	said	that	
banks	were	more	dangerous	than	standing	armies	and	sought	to	reduce	their	
power	over	the	common	man.	Andrew	Jackson	waged	a	misguided	“bank	war”	
against	the	national	bank	because	he	believed	that	the	national	bank	was	
about	“the	advancement	of	the	few	at	the	expense	of	the	many.”	After	the	
crisis	of	1907,	Woodrow	Wilson	called	for	the	end	of	the	“monopoly	of	big	
credits”	that	would	hinder	“the	true	liberties	of	men.”	After	the	Great	
Depression,	Louis	Brandeis	declared	that	the	nation’s	banks	should	be	treated	
as	a	“public	utility”	instead	of	a	“private	affair”	because	banks	gain	their	
disproportionate	power	through	the	use	of	“other	people’s	money.”	FDR	
excoriated	the	banking	system	proclaiming	that	“the	rulers	of	the	exchange	of	
mankind’s	goods	have	failed”	and	“the	unscrupulous	money	changers	stand	
indicted	in	the	court	of	public	opinion,	rejected	by	the	hearts	and	minds	of	
men.”	Roosevelt	saw	the	crisis	as	a	threat	to	the	“future	of	essential	
democracy”	and	took	it	as	a	mandate	to	use	“direct,	vigorous	action”	to	fight	
for	“the	social	values	more	noble	than	mere	monetary	profit.”	
These	leaders	may	have	been	wrong	in	their	specific	proposals,	but	they	each	
understood	something	that	current	lawmakers	are	missing:	Banking	
regulation	is	just	as	much	about	liberty,	democracy,	equal	opportunity,	and	
equality	as	it	is	about	risk	or	liquidity.	We	need	to	make	sure	banks	are	
operating	safely,	but	we	also	need	to	make	sure	they	are	serving	the	people.	
While	Washington	and	Wall	Street	proclaimed	after	the	bailouts	that	“we	were	
all	in	this	together,”	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis	were	largely	borne	by	the	
poor	and	middle‐class	people	who	were	foreclosed	upon	even	as	the	banks	
were	being	bailed	out.	As	it	turned	out,	we	did	not	rise	and	fall	together.	Wall	
Street	is	rising	and	the	public	continues	to	fall.	The	last	ten	years	have	been	
defined	by	historic	inequality,	the	rise	of	true	poverty	in	America,	and	a	
growing	racial	wealth	gap.	What	the	Obama	Administration	ignored	is	what	
was	central	in	previous	post‐crisis	responses:	that	inequality	and	banking	
policy	are	entwined.	Without	state	intervention,	credit	naturally	flows	to	the	
wealthy.	
Against	the	backdrop	of	widespread	foreclosures,	job	losses,	economic	
stagnation,	and	a	growing	wealth	gap,	Dodd‐Frank	seems	weak	and	narrow,	
technical	to	a	fault,	trees	instead	of	forest.	Even	if	the	legislation	had	managed	
to	regulate	shadow	banking	effectively,	fixed	TBTF,	and	gotten	systemic	risk	
under	control,	it	failed	to	recognize	the	cancer	underneath.	Wall	Street’s	gains	
are	not	Main	Street’s	gains,	but	its	losses	are	Main	Street’s	losses.	
The	cancer	is	that	we	have	a	broken	social	contract—the	public	supports	the	
bank,	but	the	banks	aren’t	obliged	or	interested	in	supporting	the	public.	In	
fact,	after	the	crisis	several	insiders	revealed	that	in	fact	some	traders	viewed	
their	clients	as	prey.	Dark	pools	were	created	to	front‐run	customer	orders,	
and	some	firms	were	shorting	the	very	investments	they	had	induced	their	
clients	to	buy.	The	Panama	Papers	show	what	many	have	suspected—that	the	
major	banks	are	helping	high	net‐worth	clients	evade	laws	as	well	as	
potentially	billions	of	dollars	in	tax	revenue.	Meanwhile,	these	same	firms	are	
lobbying	heavily	to	destroy	regulations	that	protect	the	public.	This	is	not	as	
hard	as	it	sounds.	Currently,	there	are	five	financial	industry	lobbyists	on	
Capitol	Hill	for	every	one	legislator.	
The	last	crisis	revealed	overlooked	problems	in	the	financial	system.	Since	
those	problems	have	been	identified,	they	will	not	easily	be	ignored	in	the	
future.	Now	we	need	to	work	on	addressing	the	reason	regulators	missed	the	
problems	for	so	long—namely,	that	they	believed	in	the	dogma	that	
government	should	not	intervene	in	any	way	that	threatened	bank	profits,	
that	the	banks	could	manage	their	own	risks,	and	that	it	was	possible	for	the	
government	to	stay	out	of	it	when	banks	failed.	We	need	to	reignite	if	not	the	
fight	at	least	the	healthy	debate	of	industry	versus	public	that	has	long	been	
central	in	banking	policy.	We	need	to	be	realistic	about	what	banks	are:	the	
central	engines	of	democracy,	and	therefore	necessarily	tied	to	the	state.	They	
are	not	the	enemy,	but	they	do	have	public	responsibilities	that	we	ignore	at	
our	peril.	
	
